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"matured." See also, BANKRUPTCY 
SERVICE LAWYERS EDITION, § 21:13 
at p. 26 (1979 as amended 1984). 
[12] The unsecured claimants in this 
case are entitled to interest, in the absence 
of a contract providing therefor, at the 
legal rate, established by applicable state 
law, from the time the respective debts 
were incurred until the date a petition un-
der any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code is 
filed. In a case under Chapter 7, such as 
this one, if there are adequate assets, then 
the unsecured creditors would also be enti-
tled to the interest accruing on their claims 
post-petition or, if the funds are inadequate 
to pay such interest in full, to their pro-rata 
share of such funds to be distributed 
among all unsecured creditors, to satisfy 
their interest claims. See § 726(aX5). 
The court reserves for a later determina-
tion whether or not interest is due to these 
claimants in the event the Packers and 
Stockyards Act, 1921 is found to be applica-
ble to the transaction considered herein. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the opinion of this court that all the 
transactions between^ the debtor and the 
various sheep ranchers listed here occur-
ring after the moment of 4he filing of the 
petition on May 11,1983 are claims entitled 
to administrative expense priority under 
Section 503(bXlXA) of the Code, as the 
actual and necessary costs and expenses of 
preserving the estate, while all those occur-
ring prior to the moment of filing are 
claims entitled to an unsecured claim priori-
ty. The administrative expense claimants, 
including Ernest Uhalde, though not enti-
tled to interest, are entitled to the immedi-
ate payment of their claims for expenses 
from the assets of the estate. The unse-
cured claims are entitled to payment with 
interest at the legal rate in the usual 
course of the orderly liquidation of the 
estate pursuant to Section 726 of the Code. 
The Memorandum Opinion and Order of 
January 23, 1983 is withdrawn and the 
unsigned judgment predicated therein is a 
nullity. 
The parties are granted leave to file, 
within the time limits and subject matter 
restrictions set forth herein, their briefs 
relating to the question of the applicability 
of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921. 
The trustee is ordered to withhold pay-
ment of any funds pursuant to this ques-
tion until the Packers Act question is re-
solved. An order will enter consistent with 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
set forth herein. 
| ttY NUMBER SYSTf M > 
In re John IL WILLIAMSON, Debtor. 
Bankruptcy No. 82C-01703. 
United States Bankruptcy Court, 
D. Utah. 
July 11, 1984. 
Supplemental Opinion Au£. 10. 1984. 
Creditor moved for distribution of re-
maining proceeds of sale of property of 
estate, and debtor moved for allowance of 
homestead exemption. The Bankruptcy 
Court, Glen E. Clark, J., held that: (1) 
mechanics' liens for which lien notices did 
not contain signature of person making 
oaths were invalid; (2) second trust deed 
recorded subsequent to improperly perfect-
ed mechanics' liens had priority over such 
mechanics' liens; (3) parties intended docu-
ments entitled "Additional Advance Note 
and Agreement" as promissory note evi-
dencing advance of additional funds se-
cured by first trustee, rather than indepen-
dent second trust deed with separate and 
inferior priority; (4) first trust deed and 
second trust deed were "security interests" 
within Utah Exemption Act which could riot 
be defeated by debtor's claim for home-
stead exemption; (5) valid statutory me-
chanics' liens were not "security interests" 
within Utah Exemption Act; and (6) judicial 
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lien was not an exception to debtor's home-
stead exemption. 
Ordered accordingly. 
1. Bankruptcy e»257 
It was not the intent of Congress to 
allow a trustee, in selling property of an 
estate, to destroy interests of creditors se-
cured by property. Bankr.Code, 11 UJ3. 
CJL § 363(e, f). 
2. Bankruptcy «=»339 
Creditor claiming interest in property 
of estate had right to object to validity of 
claims of statutory lienholders. Bankr. 
Code, 11 U.S.CJL § 502(a). 
3. Bankruptcy «=>267(2) 
Where trustee's notice of sale issued 
and sale itself took place pursuant to court 
approval and upon condition that all those 
holding valid statutory liens against real 
property of the estate would, upon sale, 
continue to hold against proceeds of sale 
lien rights equivalent to those extinguished 
by the trustee's sale, determination of va-
lidity and priority of the various lien rights 
against proceeds of the same would be 
determined as if those rights had arisen 
under state law as statutory, mechanics' 
liens charged against the real property of 
the estate. Bankr.Code, U U-S.OA. 
§ 101(39). 
4. States <*=>4.10 
Where Congress has not preempted ap-
plicable state law, that law governs. 
5. Oath e»l 
An "oath" is an affirmation of truth of 
a statement, which renders one willfully 
asserting an untruth punishable for perju-
ry-
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
6. Oath<S=>l 
In its strict sense, term "oath" refers 
to attestation coupled with invocation to 
supreme being to witness words of attest-
ing party and to visit him with judgment if 
the words be false; in its more general 
sense, the term includes any attestation or 
&&umathn whereby party signifies that he 
is bound in conscience to perform an act 
faithfully or speak truly, regardless wheth-
er or not that attestation invokes supreme 
being or is accompanied by conditional self-
<Wsing. 
7. Oath«=»l 
In Utah, term "oath" is used in its 
general sense to include concept of an af-
firmation. U.C.A.1953, 68-3-12(2); Utah 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 43(d). 
8. O a t h * * 
In Utah, essentials of an "oath" are a 
solemn declaration, manifestation of intent 
to be bound by the statement, signature of 
ths declarer, and acknowledgment by an 
authorized person that the oath was taken. 
9. Acknowledgment «=>1 
An "acknowledgment" is a formal dec-
laratioD attached to a written instrument, 
and constitutes an oath or affirmation, but 
only to the effect that person making the 
acknowledgment is same as person execu-
ting the instrument being acknowledged. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
10. Acknowledgment *=»36(2) 
A "certification," also called the "ju-
rat," constitutes official verification that 
must accompany all valid oaths in Utah; by 
means of this verification, the official ad-
ministering an acknowledgment certifies, 
pursuant to statute, that person signing 
th^t oath actually appeared before the offi-
cial, and that the person was either person-
ally known by the official to be signatory 
of the instrument or that the acknowledg-
ing party was proved to the official to be 
the signatory by the oath or affirmation of 
a credible witness known personaffy to the 
official U.C.A.1953, 57-2-6. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
11. Mechanics' Liens «=»154<2) 
In Utah, every valid notice of mechan-
ic's lien must contain an oath verifying 
truth of its contents, an oath acknowledg-
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ing identity of person executing it, and an 
official certification verifying those oaths. 
U.C.A.1953, 38-1-7, 57-2-1. 
12. Acknowledgment <3=»36(1) 
In Utah, essential parts of a notary's 
certificate constitute the essential parts of 
the certificate of any other official autho-
rized to certify acknowledgments; those 
essential parts are the official's signature, 
the official's title, his place of residence, 
and the date his commission as a notary or 
other authorization expires. U.C.A.1953, 
46-1-8, 57-2-5. 
13. Mechanics' Liens «=>154(6) 
Under Utah law, oaths and acknowl-
edgments on notices of mechanic's lien 
were void, and therefore, the notices were 
invalid, absent signature of the person 
making the oaths. U.C.A.1953.38-1-7. 57-
2-2. 
14. Mechanics9 Liens S=>154(6) 
Under Utah law, oath on notice of me-
chanic's lien lacked proper signatory and 
was consequently invalid, rendering the 
lien notice a nullity, where line reserved for 
signature of person making the acknowl-
edgment was signed erroneously by notary 
public. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-7, 57-2-2. 
15. Mechanics' Liens $=154(6) 
Even if identical signatures beneath 
oath and acknowledgment and beneath no-
tary's certification on notice of mechanic's 
lien were those of same person signing as 
lien claimant and as notary, lien notice 
would remain a nullity under Utah law in 
that notary could not notarize instrument 
in which he was named a party. U.C.A. 
1953, 38-1-7, 46-1-10, 57-2-2. 
16. Mechanics' Liens «=>154(6) 
Under Utah law, notice of mechanic's 
lien was invalid where notary certificate 
failed to contain expiration date of notary's 
commission. U.C.A.1953, 46-1-8. 
17. Mechanics' Liens 4=>116 
In Utah, substantial compliance with 
technicalities is sufficient to create validity 
of lien notices. 
18. Mechanics' Liens e»154(6) 
Under Utah law, if signature of lien 
claimant appeared anywhere on acknowl-
edgment or if notary had appended on the 
certificate his commission expiration date, 
regardless of its form, completeness, posi-
tion or even accuracy, then there would 
have been basis for finding substantial 
compliance with Utah law; but complete 
absence of oath, acknowledgment, or jurat 
was fatal to validity of lien notice. U.C.A. 
1953, 38-1-7, 46-1-8, 57-2-2. 
19. Estoppel <s»98(l) 
Creditor who had nothing to do with 
creating defective lien notices was not es-
topped from attacking validity of the lien 
notices. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-1 et seq. 
20. Mechanics' Liens <3=> 132(1) 
Under Utah law, mechanic's lien for 
which notice was filed 102 days after last 
material was furnished was invalid regard-
less of whether claimant was general con-
tractor or subcontractor. U.OA.1953, 38-
1-7. 
21. Mechanics' Liens «=> 136(2) 
Property description which contained 
identifying lot number, alternative refer-
ence to street name as a circle or a drive, 
and a numerical address was in substantial 
compliance with requirement of Utah lien 
notice statute. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-7. 
22. Mechanics' Liens «=>154(4) 
Lien notice was valid where person 
signing on behalf of claimant signed notice 
and took and signed oath and acknowledg-
ment, despite fact that erroneous entry 
was made in second blank identifying 
claimant U.C.A.1953, 38-1-7. 
23. Mortgages <&=>151(3) 
Under Utah law, lien of holder of sec-
ond trust deed recorded subsequent to re-
cording of mechanics' liens had priority 
over those mechanics' liens which were not 
properly perfected with valid lien notices. 
U.C.A.1953, 57-3-2, 57-3-3. 
24. Mortgages <8=»151(3) 
Under Utah law, valid mechanics' liens 
which related back to June 4, 1981 had 
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priority over second trust deed recorded on 
December 2, 1981. U.C.A.1953, 57-3-2, 
57-3-3. 
25. Mortgages <8=>151(5) 
Under Utah law, judgment lien which 
attached to subject property after holder of 
second trust deed perfected its lien had 
priority standing inferior to that of holder 
of the second trust deed. 
26. Mortgages «=>121 
In Utah, the advance of additional 
funds secured by previously executed and 
otherwise valid trust deed is allowed in 
circumstances where the note and trust 
deed contain clear language that the par-
ties intend to avail themselves of this type 
of arrangement 
27. Mortgages c=>121 
Parties intended documents entitled 
"Additional Advance Note and Agreement" 
as promissory note evidencing advance of 
additional funds secured by first trust 
deed, rather than independent second trust 
deed with separate and inferior priority 
standing. 
28. Homestead <&=»90, 96 
Term "security interests," in statutory 
exception to Utah homestead exemption in-
cludes, but is not limited to, security inter-
ests for the purchase price of the property 
to which the security interest attaches, and 
embraces any consensual security interest 
in the property by which the owner of the 
property voluntarily pledges that property 
as security for a debt regardless of the 
purpose of the debt U.C.A.1953, 78-23-
3(2Xb). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
29. Homestead e=>96 
First trust deed and second trust deed 
were "security interests" within meaning 
of Utah Exemption Act which could not be 
defeated by debtor's claim for homestead 
exemption. U.C.A.1953, 78-23-3<2)(b). 
30. Homestead <£»97 
Valid statutory mechanics' liens which 
were not consensual were not "security 
interests," and were not "judicial liens" 
within Utah Exemption Act, and thus were 
not valid exceptions to debtor's homestead 
exemption. U.C.A.1953, 78-23-3(2)(b). 
31. Homestead e=>90 
Judicial lien was not an exception to 
debtor's homestead exemption under Utah 
Exemption Act where it was not a security 
interest and where there was no evidence 
that it was for a debt created for purchase 
price of the property. U.C.A.1953, 78-23-
3(2Xb). 
Supplemental Opinion 
32. Homestead «=»90 
Under Utah Exemption Act, homestead 
exemption, regardless <of when it is claimed 
or recorded, takes priority over all other 
liens and encumbrances burdening the sub-
ject property with exception of those en-
cumbrances listed in the statute. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-23-1 et seq., 7&-23-3(2Xa-c); 
Const Art 22, § 1 
Joel R. Dangerfield of Roe, Fowler & 
Moxley, for Claude Hawk Corp. 
Robert C. Miner of Thomas J. Klc and 
Associates, Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah, for 
mechanics' lienholders Maxfield Plumbing, 
Rite Cabinet, Inc., Jim Williams dba J^ W. 
Electric, and James D. Featherstone dba J 
& J Tile Co. 
Ronald C. Barker, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
for mechanics' lienholders Stringham Lum-
ber Co. and V & H Enterprises. 
Marcella L. Keck, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
for mechanic's lienholder Jeff Merchant 
dba Artistic Landscaping. 
Bruce A. Maak of Rooker, Larsen, Kim-
ball & Parr, Salt Lake City, Utah, for State 
Sav. and Loan Ass'n. 
Sid Siverson pro se. 
Alan D. Frandsen, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
for Parley White dba Parley White Realty. 
Wendell P. Abies, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
for debtor, John H. Williamson. 
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Theodore E. Kanell of Hanson, Russon & 
Dunn, Salt Lake City, Utah, the trustee, on 
his own behalf. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
GLEN E. CLARK, Bankruptcy Judge. 
CASE SUMMARY 
In this case, the court is called upon to 
determine the priority of certain liens and 
encumbrances against proceeds of the sale 
of property of the estate. The issue of 
priority turns upon four questions: (1) 
whether or not certain statutory mechan-
ics' liens are valid and enforceable under 
Utah law and (2), if so, what distributive 
priority they may have in this case; (3) 
whether a recorded document constitutes 
an independent second trust deed with a 
separate and inferior priority standing of 
its own or whether it is, instead, a notice of 
the advance of additional funds secured by 
the first trust deed, made in favor of the 
lender and having a priority superior to all 
other liens and encumbrances; and (4) 
whether or not the debtor'^ claimed home-
stead exemption is valid and, if so, what 
priority it has in this case; or, in the alter-
native, whether the debtor is entitled to 
payment of a real estate commission as an 
administrative expense foe his role as a 
listing agent in the sale of the property of 
the estate. 
FACTS, PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND, AND 
ARGUMENTS 
On July 14,1982, debtor John H. William-
son filed a petition for relief under Chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The case was 
1. Out of these proceeds there must yet be paid, 
if allowed, the closing costs of sale, the debtor's 
homestead exemption, the trustee's fees, as well 
as amounts to the holders of valid statutory 
mechanics' liens. 
2. In its motion, Claude Hawk, a secured „ credi-
tor, argued that the sale proceeds are subject to 
the following undisputed liens in the following 
order of priority: 
converted to one under Chapter 7 on June 
8, 1983. 
On July 21, 1983, the Chapter 7 trustee, 
pursuant to Section 363(c) and (f) of the 
Code, noticed his intent to sell, free and 
clear of liens, the real property belonging 
to the estate. The trustee stated in his 
notice of this sale that the liens encumber-
ing the property would be "transferred" to 
the sale proceeds. 
On August 15, 1983, the court approved 
the sale of the property for $335,000.00. 
The sale was closed pursuant to the trus-
tee's notice. On August 15, the court fur-
ther ordered the following payments to be 
made from the sale proceeds; -
(a) $200,000.00 to State Savings & Loan 
Association ("State Savings"), pursuant to 
its first trust deed recorded June 4, 1981; 
(b) $10,050.00 to the real estate agency 
of Gump & Ayres as payment of its 3 
percent sales commission; 
(c) $3,500.00 in full payment of the out-
standing real estate taxes due for 1981, 
1982, and, as prorated, for 1983. 
Pursuant to the court's order, the bal-
ance of the proceeds, $121,450.00, was to 
be held in trust, pending further determina-
tion of the priority of the remaining liens 
which, by virtue of the trustee's notice and 
the court's order, had attached to these 
proceeds.1 
On August 29, 1983, the debtor was dis-
charged. 
On December 19, 1983, Claude Hawk 
Corporation ("Claude Hawk") moved this 
court for distribution of the remaining pro-
ceeds and for an order determining the 
distributive priority of the claims that have 
attached thereto, pursuant to the notice of 
the trustee and order of the court.2 
(1) Real property taxes for 1981, 1982, and, as 
prorated,, for 1983 in the sum of $3,500.00; 
(2) The debt owed to State Savings and Loan 
Association, secured by a Deed of Trust record-
ed in Salt Lake County on June 4, 1981 as Entry 
No. 3571498 in the sum of $200,000.00; 
(3) The debt owed to State Savings and Loan-
Association, evidenced by a document recorded 
in Salt Lake County on December 2, 1981 as 
Entry No. 3628145 in the sum of $45,000.00 
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In its motion, Claude Hawk contended 
that the following mechanics9 lien notices, 
in the amounts shown, are invalid: 
(1) Rite Cabinets, Inc. for $8,454.00 
(2) Gunner Anderson for $3,500.00 
(3) Sid Siverson dba S & S Construction 
for $5,800.00 
(4) Jim Williams dba J.W. Electric for 
$2,414.00 
(5) James D. Featherstone dba J & J Tile 
Co. for $6,800.00 
(6) Jeff Merchant dba Artistic Landscap-
ing for $3,346.00 (two hen notices) 
(7) Fred Levin dba Fred's Glass Shop for 
$1,617.00 
(8) Tom Williams dba Tom Williams Con-
struction for $2,400.00 
(9) Maxfield Plumbing, Inc. for $6,156.00 
(10) Edward H. Poulsen dba AJAX Insu-
lation for $720.25 
(11) V & U Enterprises for $4,720.03 
(12) Stringham Lumber Co. for $2,369.88 
(13) Jerry D. Jackson of Rain Gutter and 
Aluminum Products for $463.65 
(14) Earl J. Hemmert, Sr. dba Aire Flo 
Heating and Electric for $669.64 
Claude Hawk admits that these liens, 
arising under Utah law, would ordinarily 
take priority over its own trust deed be-
cause each of them relates back in time to 
June 4,1981, when the first work began on 
or the first materials were furnished to the 
subject property. However, Claude Hawk 
argues that, in this case, the lien notices 
are invalid for the following technical rea-
sons: the first twelve (12) claimants filed 
(reduced by $10,000.00 which was never paid 
out to the debtor); 
(4) Allowable trustee's fees up to $3350.00; 
(5) The 3 percent real estate commission to 
Gump & Ayres in the sum of $10,050.00; 
(6) Hie homestead exemption of John H. Wil-
liamson in the sum of $8,000.00; 
(7) Costs of sale, closing costs, and costs of 
tide insurance in an unknown sum. 
(8) The secured debt owed to Claude Hawk 
Corporation evidenced by the trust deed record-
ed in Salt Lake County on December 2, 1981 as 
Entry No. 3628146 in die sum of $44,950.00 
with interest at the annual rate of 15 percent 
front June 3, 1981, yielding $18.47 per day, plus 
costs of $182.80 and a reasonable attorney's fee 
of $2334-50 (which debt Claude Hawk agreed to 
subordinate to the interests of State Savings). 
notices containing fatally defective ac-
knowledgments or certificates; claimant 
number thirteen (13) in the list filed his 
notice after the 100 day deadline estab-
lished by controlling Utah law; and the last 
claimant in the list, number fourteen (14), 
filed a notice that does not contain an accu-
rate description of the property against 
whkh the lien is charged. 
The holders of these allegedly defective 
a^d invalid lien notices filed responses ar-
guing, on the contrary, that any defects in 
these notices are de minimus, that the 
notices are in substantial compliance with 
Utah law, and that the claims of these 
mechanics' lienholders have priority over 
the claim of Claude Hawk because their 
h*ns relate back to June 4, 1981, a time 
before Claude Hawk's trust deed was re-
corded. 
State Savings argues only that, regard-
te&s of the outcome of the priority battle 
between Claude Hawk and the mechanics, 
the priority standing of State Savings is 
superior to all other interest holders be-
cause both its original loan of $200,000.00 
a^d its subsequent loan of $45,000.00 are 
secured by the first trust deed which holds 
top priority. State Savings denies the ex-
istence of any second trust deed and as-
serts that the second loan was an advance 
°f additional funds secured by the first 
trust deed, pursuant to the provisions con-
tained in the pertinent loan documents and 
a* allowed by Utah law. 
On January 19, 1984, a hearing was held 
before this court1 At this hearing, Claude 
3. Joel R. Dangerfield of the Salt Lake City firm 
tof Roe, Fowler & Moxley appeared for Claude 
Uawk. Robert C. Miner of the Salt Lake City 
firm of Thomas J. Klc and Associates, Incx, 
appeared for mechanics' lienholders Maxfield 
Plumbing. Rite Cabinet, Inc^ Jim Williams dba 
4.W. Electric, and James D. Featherstone dba J 
fe J Tile Co. Ronald C. Barker of Salt Lake City 
appeared for mechanics' lienholders Stringham 
Lumber Co. and V & H Enterprises. Marcella 
L Keck of Salt Lake City appeared for mechan-
ic's lienholder Jeff Merchant dba Artistic Land-
scaping. Bruce A. Maak of the Salt Lake City 
firm of Rooker, Larsen. Kimball & Parr ap-
beared for State Savings. Sid Siverson of Salt 
Lake City appeared pro se. Alan D. Frandsen of 
%ah Lake City appeared for Parley White dba 
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Hawk withdrew its objection to the me- person" within 
chanics' liens of Stringham Lumber Co. and 
V & H Enterprises and stated that the 
remaining judgment lien of Parley White, 
though technically valid, was recorded in 
Salt Lake County on May 6,1982, after the 
Claude Hawk trust deed was recorded. 
The court also heard arguments on behalf 
of certain of the parties.' Then, upon re-
quest of debtor's counsel, the debtor was 
granted leave to brief the issue of the 
validity and priority of debtor's homestead 
exemption and debtor's alternative claim 
for a real estate commission for the work 
performed as listing agent in the sale of 
the property of the estate. Other parties 
were granted leave to file opposing briefs. 
The court took all matters addressed at the 
hearing under advisement 
On January 31, 1984, pursuant to the 
leave of court, the debtor filed a motion for 
allowance of his homestead exemption or, 
in the alternative, for the allowance of his 
real estate commission as an administrative 
expense. The debtor argued that he filed 
his notice of homestead exemption on Au-
gust 26, 1982 and waived his claim for real 
estate commission provided he would ob-
tain that exemption. He also asserted that 
there was no objection to his exemption 
until the "final gasp of the oral argument" 
on January 19, 1984. 
Claude Hawk filed its memorandum in 
opposition to the debtor's motion for the 
allowance of his homestead exemption, ar-
guing that such exemption is inferior in 
priority to the lien of Claude Hawk and 
that the debtor is not entitled, in the alter-
native or otherwise, to any real estate com-
mission for the sale of the property of the 
estate. 
The debtor replied to the memorandum in 
opposition of Claude Hawk, arguing that 
Claude Hawk had knowledge of debtor's 
role as a listing agent and waived its objec-
tion to debtor's alternative claim for a real 
estate commission by failing to object 
thereto and that debtor, as a "disinterested 
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the context of Section 
101(13) of the Code, is entitled to a nunc 
pro tunc order approving his professional 
services for which compensation should be 
paid as an administrative expense. 
Stringham Lumber Co. and V & H Enter-
prises, creditors and mechanics' tienholders 
(to whose hens Claude Hawk withdrew its 
objection) filed their own objections to the 
allowance of the debtor's claim for home-
stead exemption, arguing that the debtor 
waived his claim for real estate commis-
sion, that his application for commission 
(made in the alternative) is not timely, and 
that the homestead exemption, under Utah 
law, is inferior to mechanics' liens securing 
sums owed for improvements on residential 
property 
THE ISSUES 
The issues to be resolved are: 
(1) whether or not certain mechanics' 
liens, which now constitute liens on the 
proceeds of the sale of estate property, 
sold free and clear of Hens pursuant to 
Section 363 of the Code, are valid and en-
forceable under Utah law, and 
(2) if so, whether or not they have priori-
ty superior to the lien of Claude Hawk; 
(3) whether or not the document of State 
Savings recorded in Salt Lake County on 
December 2, 1981 as Entry No. 3628145 in 
the sum of $45,000.00 (reduced by $10,-
000.00 representing funds not advanced) 
constitutes an independent second trust 
deed with a separate priority Handing infe-
rior to the valid mechanics' Bens or wheth-
er it is, instead, a notice of advance of 
additional funds secured by the first trust 
deed, made in favor of State Savings and 
having a priority standing superior to all 
other liens against the proceeds; and 
(4) whether or not the debtor has a valid 
homestead exemption, and if so, what prior-
ity said exemption has under Utah law; or, 
in the alternative, whether or not the debt-
or is entitled to a real estate commission, to 
Parley White Realty. Wendell P. AWes ap-
peared for the debtor, John H. Williamson. 
Theodore £. Kanell of the Salt Lake City firm of 
Hanson, Russon ft Dunn, the trustee, appeared 
on his own behalf. 
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be paid as an administrative expense, for 
the sale of the property of the estate. 
DECISION 
(1) 
The Validity of the Mechanics' Liens 
On July 21, 1983, the trustee of this 
Chapter 7 case noticed, pursuant to Section 
363(c) and (f) of the Code, a sale of certain 
real property of the estate, free and clear 
of liens. 
[11 Section 363(f) of the Code provides 
that 
The Trustee may sell property under sub-
section (b) or (c) of this section free and 
clear of any interest in such property of 
an entity other than the estate . . . 
It is clear from the Code that it was not the 
intent of Congress to allow a trustee, in 
selling property of the estate, to destroy 
the interests of creditors secured by said 
property. Section 363(e) of the Code pro-
vides that: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this section, at any time, on request of an 
entity that has an interest in property 
used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be 
used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, the 
court shall prohibit or condition such use, 
sale, or lease as is necessary to provide 
adequate protection of such interest 
In this case, no creditor moved the court 
for "adequate protection." This was un-
doubtedly due to the fact that the trustee, 
in his notice of intended sale, indicated that 
all liens against the subject real property, 
as to the extent such liens were valid, 
would be "transferred" to the proceeds of 
sale.4 
4. It is clear from the legislative history of the 
Code that what the trustee designated as a 
, "transfer" of liens could constitute adequate 
protection of the lienholders' interests under 
Section 363(e). H.R. 95-595 p. 345, U.S.Code 
Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5787, 6301. See 
also, In the Matter of Circus Time, Inc., 5 B.R. 1 
(Bkrtcy.Ct.Maine 1979); COLLIER'S ON BANK-
RUPTCY, 15th ed. 1f 363.07. 
5. The court is not called upon to determine 
whether the trustee's notice and sale of the 
subject property with court approval could oper-
[2] On December 19, 1983, Claude 
Hawk, in its application for distribution of 
proceeds of the trustee's sale, objected to 
the validity and priority of the claims of 14 
statutory Jienholders. As a creditor claim-
ing an interest in the property of the es-
tate, Claude Hawk has the right to object 
to the validity of these other claims, pursu-
ant to Section 502(a) of the Code, which 
provides, in pertinent part: 
A claim or interest, proof of which is 
filed under Section 501 of this title, is 
deemed allowed, unless a party in inter-
est, including a creditor of a partner in a 
partnership that is a debtor in a case 
under chapter 7 of this title, objects. 
"There is no doubt that the phrase 'parties 
in interest' applies to those who [like 
Claude Hawk in this case] have some inter-
est in the assets of the debtor being admin-
istered in the case." COLLIER'S ON 
BANKRUPTCY, 15th ed., 1501.01 at p. 
502-12. 
The question raised by Claude Hawk is 
which, if any, of these 14 liens is valid.5 
[3] The court finds that the trustee's 
notice of sale issued and the sale itself took 
place pursuant to court approval and upon 
the condition that all those holding valid 
statutory liens against the real property of 
the estate would, upon sale, continue to 
hold against the proceeds of sale lien rights 
equivalent to those extinguished by the 
trustee's sale. For this reason, the deter-
mination of the validity and priority of the 
various lien rights against the proceeds of 
the sale must be determined as if those 
rights had arisen under Utah law as statu-
tory mechanics' liens% charged against the 
real property of the estate. 
ate to extinguish these statutory liens entirely 
and give to the former lienholders a totally new 
secured status in the proceeds of the sale. Nor 
is the court called upon to determine whether 
or not such new security interests would be 
entitled to the same priority standing they for-
merly had under state law. 
6. The following explanation appears in COL-
LIER'S ON BANKRUPTCY, 15th ed., ff 101.28 at 
p. 101-67: 
The definition of "lien" is new [in the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code] and is intended to encom-
IN RE WILLIAMSON 
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[4] Article I, Section 8, of the United 
States Constitution provides that "Con-
gress shall have power to establish uniform 
laws of bankruptcy" throughout the United 
States. Where Congress has not pre-empt-
ed applicable state law, that law governs. 
The determination of the validity and prior-
ity of statutory liens against the proceeds 
in this case must be made in light of the 
applicable Utah law governing the creation, 
validity, and effect of the mechanics' liens 
originally filed against the real property of 
the estate whose sale gave rise to the pro-
ceeds now charged with these same liens. 
See, Butner v. United States, 4 Bank.Ct 
Dec. 1259 (1979). 
Those controlling provisions of Utah law 
appear in the Utah Code Annotated Sec-
tions 38-1-1 et seq. and 57-2-1 et seq. 
(1953, as amended). 
(a) Technical Requirements of Mechanics' 
Liens in Utah 
Section 38-1-7 requires the individual ex-
ecuting a notice of claim of mechanic's lien 
to verify the contents of such a notice with 
an oath.7 
Section 57-2-1 requires that every writ-
ing affecting real estate be acknowledged 
according to the provision of Utah Code 
Ann. Section 57-2-1 et seq. (1953) (Utah's 
version of the Uniform Acknowledgments 
Act). 
The distinction between an oath and an 
acknowledgment is this: 
pass all three kinds of liens defined under the 
Code; judicial liens, security interests, and 
statutory liens. The word lien" is defined as 
a charge against or interest in property to 
secure payment of a debt or performance of 
an obligation Although the existence and 
effect of liens are ordinarily to be determined 
by state law, state law should not be applied 
where its application would frustrate or debi-
litate federally enacted policy. Di Pierro v. 
Cullen (In re Taddeo), 4 C.B.C2d 185 (B.CLJE. 
D.N.Y.), aff'd, 5 C.B.C.2d 1309 (EJ).N.Y.1981), 
aff'd, 685 F.2d 24, 6 C.B.C.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 
1982). 
Section 101(39) of the Code defines a statutory 
lien as follows: 
. . . "statutory lien" means lien arising solely 
by force of a statute on specified circumstanc-
es or conditions, or lien of distress for rent 
[5-8] An oath is an affirmation of £he 
truth of a statement, which renders one 
willfully asserting an untruth punishable 
for perjury. In its strict sense the term 
refers to an attestation that is coupled with 
an invocation to the Supreme Being to wit-
ness the words of the attesting party and 
to visit him with judgment if the words be 
false. In its more general sense, the term 
oath includes any attestation or affirmation 
whereby a party signifies that he is bound 
in conscience to perform an act faithfully 
or speak truly, regardless whether or not 
that attestation invokes the Supreme Being 
or is accompanied by a conditional self-
cursing. In Utah the term'oath is used in 
its general sense to include the concept of 
an "affirmation." Utah Code Ann. Section 
68-3-12(2) (1953); Rule 43(d) Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Moreover, in Utah: 
. . . the essentials of an oath are: 1. A 
solemn declaration. 2. Manifestation of 
intent to be bound by the statement 3. 
Signature of the declarer. 4. Acknowl-
edgment by an authorized person that 
the oath was taken. 
McKnight v. State Land BdL, 14 Utah 2d 
726, 381 P.2d 726, at 734 (1963). 
[9] An acknowledgment* on the other 
hand, is a formal declaration which is at-
tached to a written instrument This decla-
ration constitutes an oath or affirmation, 
but only to the effect that the person mak-
ing the acknowledgment is the same as the 
person executing the instrument being ac-
knowledged. 
whether or not statutory, but does not include 
statutory interest or judicial lien, whether or 
not such interest or lien is provided by or is 
dependent on a statute and whether or not 
such interest is made fully effective by statute. 
In the words of the 2 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY 
MANUAL, 3rd ed., H 545.01 at p. 545-1: 
A statutory lien is one that arises automatical-
ly and is not based on an agreement to give a 
lien or on a judicial action. Mechanics', ma-
terialmen's, warehousemen's, and tax liens 
are examples [of statutory liens]. 
7. In First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 631 
?J2d 919 (Utah 1981), the court held that a 
mechanic's lien was invalid because, though it 
was properly acknowledged, it was not verified 
by an oath as to the truth of its contents. 
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flOJ A certification, also called the "ju-
rat," constitutes the official verification 
that must accompany all valid oaths in 
Utah. By means of this verification, the 
official administering the acknowledgment 
certifies, pursuant to Utah Code.Ann. Sec-
tion 57-2-6 (1953), that (1) the person sign-
ing that oath actually appeared before the 
official, and that (2) said person was either 
personally known by the official to be the 
signatory of the instrument or (3) that the 
acknowledging party was proved to the 
official to be the signatory by the oath or 
affirmation of a credible witness known 
personally to the official 
[11] Thus, in Utah, every valid notice of 
mechanic's lien must contain an oath veri-
fying the truth of its contents, an oath 
acknowledging the identity of the person 
executing it, and an official certification 
verifying those oaths. 
In this case, 12 of the 14 lien notices 
were identical in form. On the front side 
of these 12 notice forms appeared the legal 
language perfecting a valid mechanic's lien 
under Utah law. This language was inter-
spersed with blanks to be filled in with the 
appropriate details required by the mechan-
ic's lien statute (Utah Code Ann. Section 
38-1-7 (1981)), On the reverse side of this 
notice appeared the following declaration 
which contained language that, apparently, 
was to serve (1) as the signatory's oath as 
to the contents of the notice, (2) the oath 
acknowledging the signature on the notice, 
and (3) the official verification: 
STATE OF UTAH I 
:ss 
COUNTY OF ) 
being first duty sworn, says that 
he is claimants in the foregoing No-
tice of Lien;" that he has read said notice and 
knows the contents thereof, and that the same is 
true of his own knowledge. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
day of , 19 
Notary Public 
It will be necessary to analyze this decla-
ration phrase by phrase: 
(1) The purpose of the phrase "STATE 
OF UTAH, COUNTY OF :ss" is to 
indicate the venue in which the oath is 
made. The "ss" is a contraction of the 
Latin word "scilicet," which means "to 
wit." Neither the venue information or the 
"ss" is material to the document See, 
McCord & Nave Merchantile Co. v. Glen, 
6 Utah 139, 21 P. 500, at 501 (1889). 
(2) Following this is the formal declara-
tion containing the oath as to the contents 
of the notice and the acknowledgment of 
the signature. This declaration begins 
with a blank line in which is to be written 
the name of the person signing both the 
notice of lien and this declaration. 
(3)' Following the opening blank line is 
~the phrase "being first duly sworn." In 
actuaf practice, an individual taking an oath 
before a notary does not normally raise his 
arm to the square and solemnly repeat the 
words of the oath as is done by a witness 
prior to testifying in court or at a deposi-
tion. Instead the usual practice is for the 
affiant (that is, the person desiring to be 
bound by an oath) to appear before the 
authorized official and sign the attestation, 
indicating that he is making the declaration 
upon his oath or affirmation. 
(4) Following this language is the phrase 
"says that he is 
claimant, in the foregoing Notice of Lien." 
By these words, the person whose name 
appears in the opening blank attests, under 
oath, that he is the same person who 
signed the Notice of Lien. In the blank 
which appears in this phrase, this person 
may provide information setting forth his 
relationship to the hen claimant Although 
Utah law does not require that this infor-
mation be given, it is often helpful to estab-
lish the relationship between the lien claim-
ant and the individual signing the lien no-
tice and taking the required oaths, for very 
often it is a principal, agent, or employee of 
the claimant that signs the lien notice and 
appears before the official to sign the ac-
knowledgment 
(5) Following this is the phrase "that he 
has read said notice and knows the con-
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tents thereof, and that the same is true of 
his own knowledge." By this language the 
person signing the declaration attests that 
he, as the same person who signed the 
notice of lien, knows that the contents 
thereof are true. 
(6) Following this is another blank line. 
This is for the signature of the person who 
signed the notice and whose name appears 
in the opening blank of the acknowledg-
ment This signature is a necessary ele-
ment of both the oath attesting to the truth 
of the contents of the notice of lien and of 
the oath acknowledging the signature 
thereon. McKnight v. Land BcL, supra. 
[12] (7) Following this is the certificate 
or verification, also called a "jurat," of the 
official authorized to administer the ac-
knowledgment In most cases, this official 
is a notary public. In rare cases it may be 
a judge or clerk of the court, or some other 
public official. Utah Code Ann. Section 
57-2-5 (1953). The essential parts of this 
certificate are set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
Section 46-1-8 (1953), which provides that: 
To all acknowledgments, oaths, affirma-
tions and instruments of every kind tak-
en and certified by a notary public he 
shall afix to his signature his official title 
and his place of residence, and the date 
on which his commission expires. 
This court concludes that, in Utah, the es-
sential parts of a notary's certificate consti-
tute the essential parts of the certificate of 
any other official authorized to certify ac-
knowledgments. Those essential parts are 
(1) the official's signature, (2) the official's 
title, (3) his place of residence (meaning the 
city or county and state in which he re-
sides), and (4) the date his commission, as a 
notary or other authorization, expires. It 
will be necessary to analyze the elements 
of the jurat that appeared on the Ken no-
tices in this case: 
(a) The first phrase of the jurat is "Sub-
scribed and sworn to before me . . ." The 
purpose of this language is to certify that 
the person making the foregoing acknowl-
edgment did, in fact, appear before the 
official and did subscribe to the acknowl-
edgment and oath in the declaration. In 
other words, it is to certify that the signa-
tory voluntarily signed the declaration in 
the presence of the certifying official under 
penalty of perjury should his declaration 
prove to be false. 
(b) Following this language in the jurat, 
is the phrase "this day of 
. 19 " Into these blanks 
the official before whom the oaths are exe-
cuted fills in the numerals and words set-
ting forth the date on which the signatory 
appeared before the official and subscribed 
to the declaration. The court finds, in light 
of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Sec-
tion 46-1-8, that the date on which the 
certification was made does not constitute 
one of the essential parts of the certificate. 
(c) Following this is a blank line for the 
signature of the official administering the 
oath. The court finds, in light of the provi-
sions of Utah Code Ann. Section 46-1-8, 
that the official is not only required to afix 
his signature, but must also afix his official 
title (e.g., notary public, clerk of court, 
judge, etc), his residence (city or county, 
and state) and the expiration date of his 
commission to administer oaths. 
(b) Application of Utah Law to the Lien 
Notices in this Case. 
On ten lien notices in this case, the per-
son whose name appeared in the opening 
blank of the acknowledgment failed to sign 
i t In McKnight v. Land Bd., supra, the 
court held that such a signature is a neces-
sary element of an oath. In Graff v. Boise 
Cascade Corp., 660 P.2d 721 (Utah 1983), 
the court held that the absence of the name 
appearing to identify the person verifying 
the claim and the absence of the signature 
of the person who purportedly swore, un-
der oath, as to the veracity of the claim 
rendered the notice invalid. 
[13-15] Taken together, these cases 
clearly stand for the proposition that, in 
Utah, the signature of the person making a 
written oath is essential. Absent this sig-
nature, the oath and acknowledgment are 
void. Without the oath and the acknowl-
edgment, the requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. Sections 3&-1-7 and 57-2-2 (1953) are 
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not met; and the notice of lien is, there-
fore, invalid. 
For these reasons, this court holds that 
the lien notices of the following ten (10) 
claimants are invalid for lack of this essen-
tial signature: 
(1) Rite Cabinets, Inc. for $8,454.00 
(2) Gunner Anderson for $3,500.00 
(3) Sid Siverson dba S & S Construction 
for $5,800.00 
(4) Jim Williams dba J.w/ Electric for 
$2,414.00 
(5) James D. Featherstone dba J £ J Tile 
Co. for $6,800.00 
(6) Jeff Merchant dba Artistic Landscap-
ing for $3,346.00 (two lien notices) 
(7) Fred Levin dba Fred's Glass Shop for 
$1,617.00 
(8) Tom Williams dba Tom Williams Con-
struction for $2,400.00 
(9) Maxfield Plumbing, Inc. for 
$6,156.00 * 
(10) Edward H. Poulsen dba AJAX Insu-
lation for $720.25 * 
[16] In reaching this decision, the court 
is aware that Jeff Merchant dba Artistic 
Landscaping, recorded two notices of lien 
for the same claim, one on June 18, 1982, 
and another on June 29, 1982. Apparently, 
the second notice was intended to correct 
defects in the first Unfortunately, both 
notices are invalid: the first, because the 
acknowledgment was not signed by Jeff 
Merchant; and the second, because the no-
tary certificate is improper for failure to 
contain an essential element of the notary's 
certificate, namely, the expiration date of 
the notary's commission. 
8. On this notice, the line reserved for the signa-
ture of the person making the acknowledgment 
was signed erroneously by the notary public. 
The oath, therefore, lacks a proper signatory 
and is, consequently invalid, rendering the lien 
notice a nullity. 
9. On this notice, the signature beneath the oath 
and acknowledgment is identical to that be-
neath the notary's certification. The court be-
lieves that these signatures are those of the 
notary and that, for this reason, the notice is 
invalid. However, even if these two signatures 
were those of Edward Poulsen, signing as lien 
[17] Although, in Utah, substantial 
compliance with these technicalities is suf-
ficient to create validity, nevertheless, the 
absence of an essential element has been 
held by the Utah Supreme Court to render 
an otherwise valid lien notice technically 
defective. See, Graff v. Boise Cascade, 
supra, at 722-23. 
[18] If the signature of the claimant 
had appeared anywhere on the acknowledg-
ment or if the notary had appended on the 
certificate his commission expiration date— 
regardless of its form, completeness, posi-
tion or even accuracy—then there would 
have been a basis for finding substantial 
compliance with Utah law. But the com-
plete absence of an essential element of an 
oath, acknowledgment, or jurat is, in Utah, 
fatal to the validity of the lien notice. 
[19J All the lien notices addressed so 
far, except for the second lien notice of 
Jeff Merchant, were completed, acknowl-
edged, and notarized by the debtor, John 
H. Williamson. Because of this fact, these 
lien claimants argue that, whatever their 
defects, these notices should not be invali-
dated since any errors in them were the 
fault of the debtor and not of the claim-
ants. This estoppel argument would be a 
persuasive defense against an attack made 
on these notices by the debtor, who could 
not be allowed to enjoy the fruits of his 
errors at the expense of those injured 
thereby. However, in this case, the lien 
notices are being attacked by another credi-
tor, Claude Hawk, who, according to the 
record before the court, had nothing to do 
with creating the defective notices. As to 
him the lienholders' estoppel argument, al-
though not designated as such, must fail.10 
claimant and as notary, the result would be the 
same because, in Utah, a notary is disqualified 
from notarizing an instrument in which he is 
named as a party. See, Utah Code Ann. Section 
46-1-10 (1953, as amended). 
10. See, Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 
1974), where the court held that the new hus-
band's statement that support money from the 
natural father was unwanted did not estop the 
mother of the children owed support or the 
children themselves from bringing an action 
against the natural father to recover the support 
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[20] The provisions of Utah's median- Utah Code 
ic's lien statute require that a lien notice be 
filed within 80 days after the date the last 
material was furnished if the claimant is a 
subcontractor and 100 days after such date 
if the claimant is a general contractor. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-7 (1981). 
With regard to the notice of lien of Jerry 
D. Jackson of Rain Gutter and Aluminum 
Products, the court finds that the essential 
technical elements of the oath, acknowledg-
ment and verification were met However, 
the lien notice shows, on its face, that the 
last materials were furnished on February 
25, 1982, and the notice was recorded on 
June 8,1982. Counting February 26 as the 
first day and June 7 as the last, the court 
finds that this lien notice was filed 102 
days after the last materials were fur-
nished. Whether Jerry D. Jackson was a 
general contractor or a subcontractor is 
immaterial since this notice, filed after 102 
days, is late under either provision of the 
statute. For these reasons, the court finds 
that this lien is invalid 
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[21] With regard to the lien notice of 
Aire Flo Heating and Electric ("Aire Flo"), 
the court finds no defect in the oath, the 
acknowledgment, or the notary's certifi-
cate. Claude Hawk claims, however, that 
the description of the property against 
which this lien is charged is maccurate. 
This is true. The proper description for the 
debtor's property was 
All of lot 6, Arlington Hills, Plat *F, 
known by the address 575 Cambridge 
Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah. ' 
The Aire Flo lien notice contains the follow-
ing description: 
Lot 6. Cambridge Circle or 575 Cam-
bridge Drive, Salt Lake. 
Utah law provides that the lien notice con-
tain, inter alia, 
. . . a description of the property to be 
charged with the lien, sufficient for iden-
tification . . . 
tnc, 394 P.2d 383, 15 Utah 2d 427 (1964), where 
the court held that a letter, written by the insur-
er of the corporation's vehicle, mailed to the 
collision insurer of the other vehicle, and stat-
ino that th*» mllicinn incnrwrV aiHmcrsitiftn r4aim 
Ann. Section 88-1-7 (1981). 
Had Aire Flo failed to put any property 
description on its notice of lien or had the 
description been clearly erroneous, the lien 
would have been defective. But here the 
property description is in substantial com-
pliance with the statute. It is "sufficient 
for identification/' It contains the identify-
ing lot number, a reference to Cambridge 
Circle and Cambridge Drive, and a numeri-
cal address. Even if the description might 
create some confusion, it is sufficient to 
put all parties with interest in the correct 
parcel of property on notice of this claim-
ant's lien. Moreover, the Salt Lake County 
recorder was able to record the document 
in spite of the minor and immaterial defect 
in the description. The court finds this lien 
notice to be in substantial compliance with 
the requirements of Utah Code Ann. Sec-
tion 38-1-7 (1981). 
[22] With regard to the V & H Enter-
prises' Ben, Mabel Stringham signed the 
notice for V A H Enterprises. Then, be-
neath that signature, the following declara-
tion appears: 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Mabel E Stringham, being duly sworn, de-
poses and says that (he) (she) is Stringham Lum-
ber Co., claimant- in the foregoing Notice of 
Lien, that he has read said hen and knows the 
contents thereof, and that the same is true of his 
own knowledge. 
/s/Mabel E. Stringham/s/ 
Subscribed and sworn before me this 
day of , 1982. 
Dick L Smith 
[SEAL] Notary Public, residing at 
Bountiful 
My Commission Expires 
08-18-84 
The only defect in this notice occurs in 
the acknowledgment where Mabel String-
ham wrote, in the second blank, the words 
would be considered as soon as the personal 
injury claims were settled, would not estop the 
corporation from raising as a defense to the 
action brought by the collision insurer the rule 
acrainsf sniiftincr a raitcr of action. 
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"Stringham Lumber" instead of "V & H 
Enterprises." The court has already con-
cluded that, under the law of Utah, there is 
no essential requirement that the person 
taking the oath and making the acknowl-
edgment state his, her, or its relationship 
to the claimant. The requirement is only 
that the claimant or the person signing on 
behalf of the claimant sign the notice and 
that the same signatory also take and sign 
the oath and acknowledgment Here Ma-
bel Stringham signed the notice for V & H 
Enterprises, and she took and signed the 
oath and acknowledgment as required. 
The notary's certificate is proper. The lien 
is, therefore, valid. 
With regard to the Stringham Lumber 
Co/s lien notice, Claude Hawk withdrew its 
objection thereto, which is just as well 
since this court was unable to find any 
defect in that notice. 
The court also finds that Parley White 
has a valid judgment lien against the pro-
ceeds of the sale of the property of the 
estate. 
(2) 
The Priority of the Mechanics' Liens 
In light of the foregoing analysis of the 
validity of the various statutory mechanics' 
liens charged against the proceeds of the 
sale of real property of the estate, it is the 
court's conclusion that Claude Hawk has a 
security interest with priority over all the 
liens found herein to be invalid. The court 
bases this opinion on the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. Section 57-3-2, -3 (1953, as 
amended), which provide that a holder of a 
recorded interest in real property will have 
priority over every subsequent interest, 
whether recorded or unrecorded, and such 
11. Had the time period for perfecting these me-
chanics' liens under state law extended beyond 
the date of the filing of the petition, then the 
lienholders could have had ten days in which to 
perfect their lien rights. COLLIER'S 15th ed. 
contains the following explanation of the perti-
nent provisions of the Code governing this pro-
cedure: . 
. ... The intervention of a petition under title 
11 should not cut off an interest holder's 
opportunity to perfect where the interest hold-
er could have perfected against an entity sub-
sequently acquiring rights in the property if 
holder will also have priority over every 
prior unrecorded interest of which said 
holder did not have actual knowledge ("ac-
tual knowledge" being inferred from the 
circumstances). 
[23] Claude Hawk recorded its second 
trust deed on December 2, 1981, subse-
quent to the recording of these mechanics' 
liens, all of which relate back to June 4, 
1981. In spite of this fact, Claude Hawk's 
lien has priority. This is because the lien 
rights of mechanics, which arise when the 
debt owed to them is incurred, are created 
by statute and must be preserved by the 
filing of a valid notice of lien within the 
time limits set by the law. The failure of 
certain of these lien claimants to properly 
perfect their liens with valid lien notices 
resulted in "the expiration of their lien 
rights within 80 days for subcontractors 
and 100 days for general contractors. 
[24,25] Because their lien rights ex-
pired, Claude Hawk's trust deed, which the 
court has examined and finds facially valid, 
has priority over all those liens whose no-
tices the court has found to be invalid here. 
The court need not consider, in this case, 
whether or not Claude Hawk, as a subse-
quent recorder, had actual knowledge of 
the prior existence of the unrecorded (that 
is, unrecorded by virtue of their invalidity) 
interests of these lien claimants. These 
claimants should have perfected their 
rights, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 
38-1-7 (1953), long before the debtor filed 
his petition on July 14, 1982, which filing 
took place well over the 100 days after the 
last work was completed or last materials 
furnished on February^ 25, 1982.11 Of 
~ "* bankruptcy had not intervened. There is no 
time limit other than as provided under non-
bankruptcy law, and section 362(b)(3) pro-
vides an exception from the automatic stay to 
permit such perfection. The exception to this 
general rule is contained in section 
547(eX2)(C) which limits post-petition perfec-
tion in the context of the preference section to 
10 days after the transfer takes effect between 
the parties. 
Thus, under section 9-301(2) of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, perfection of a pur-
chase money security interest within ten days 
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course, those few remaining valid mechan-
ics' liens, whose dates of filing relate back 
to the date the first work was performed or 
the first materials furnished, will continue 
to have priority over the second trust deed 
of Claude Hawk, while the judgment lien of 
Parley White dba Parley White Realty, be-
cause it attached to the subject property 
after the time Claude Hawk perfected its 
lien, will continue to have a priority stand-
ing inferior to that of Claude Hawk. 
(3) 
The Trust Deed Issue 
Having addressed the questions perti-
nent to the first two issues in. this case,12 
the court now turns to the arguments of 
State Savings and Loan Association. 
The issue raised by State Savings is 
whether or not a duly recorded document 
constitutes an independent second trust 
deed with a separate and inferior priority 
standing or whether it is, instead, a notice 
of advance of additional funds secured by 
State Savings' first trust deed which has 
superior priority to all other encumbrances 
against the proceeds of sale. 
The first trust deed of State Savings is 
dated June 3, 1981 and was executed by 
John H. Williamson as trustor in favor of 
State Savings and Loan Association as 
trustee and beneficiary; it wal recorded in 
Salt Lake County as Entry No. 3571498 on 
June 4, 1981, in Book 5255 at page number 
1351. That trust deed contained the fol-
lowing language: 
of its making will relate back to defeat an 
intervening lien creditor whose rights arise 
during the period between the making of the 
security agreement and its perfection. In this 
situation, the trustee, as an intervening lien 
creditor, cannot avoid the purchase money 
security interest that is unperfected on the 
date the petition is filed, so long as the holder 
of the purchase money security interest later 
perfects within the prescribed ten-day period. 
The same analysis would also apply to the 
holder of mechanic's lien, if state law would 
permit perfection to relate back so as to de-
feat an intervening lien creditor For a 
discussion of the effect of Section 546(b) on a 
holder of mechanic's lien, see In re Saberman, 
[3 B.R. 316 (Bkrtcy.Ct.N.D.I11.1980)]. 
. . . Trustor CONVEYS AND WAR-
RANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following 
described property, situated in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah: 
LOT 6, ARLINGTON HILLS SUBDI-
VISION PLAT "F", ACCORDING TO 
THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON 
FILE AND ON RECORD IN THE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY RECORDER'S 
OFFICE. 
Together with all buildings, fixtures, . . . 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) 
payment of the indebtedness evidenced 
by a promissory note of even date here-
with, in the principal sum of $200,000.00 
made by Trustor, . . . (2) the performance 
of each and every obligation, covenant, 
promise, and agreement of Trustor here-
in and in said note contained; (3) the 
payment of such additional loans or ad-
vances as hereafter may be made to 
Trustor or his successors in title or as-
signs, for any purpose, at any time be-
fore the cancellation of this Trust Deed, 
when evidenced i>y promissory note or 
notes or agreement reciting that they are 
secured by this Trust Deed provided that 
nothing herein contained shall be con-
sidered as limiting the amounts that shall 
be secured hereby when advanced to pro-
tect the security or in accordance with 
covenants in the Trust Deed; and (4) the 
payment of all sums expended or ad-
vanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant 
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 15th ed., J 546.-' 
03(2] at pp. 546-8 to 546-9. In this case, how-
ever, the lien rights of the mechanics expired 
prior to the filing of the petition by the debtor. 
12. Claude Hawk's argument that the lienhold-
ers' failure to commence an action to foreclose 
their liens within 12 months, as required by 
Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-5 (1981), is with-
out merit for two reasons: first, the automatic 
stay prevented the lienholders from bringing 
such an action against the debtor or the estate; 
and, second, Section 108(c) of the Code tolls the 
time for the bringing of such an action until the 
later of (a) the end of such period of time or (b) 
30 days after the stay is terminated pursuant to 
Section 362(c) and (d) of the Code. See, In re 
Cruseturner, 8 B.R. 581 (Bkrtcy.Ct.Utah 1981). 
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to the terms hereof, together with inter-
est thereon as herein provided. 
Moreover, an accompanying document, 
entitled "Additional Advance Note and 
Agreement" for $45,000.00 dated Decem-
ber 1981, and recorded on December 2, 
1981, contained the following language: 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the under-
signed jointly and severally promise to 
pay to the order of STATE SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION . . . the sum 
of $45,000 . . . and this agreement is 
hereby made a part of the original note 
and TRUST DEED representing said 
loan dated June 3, 1981, and recorded 
June 4, 1981, Book 5255 at page 1351 of 
the records of the County Recorder of 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH. 
It is clear from these documents that it 
was the intent of the parties that State 
Savings advance an additional sum of $45,-
000.00 to the debtor, which sum was to be 
secured by the first trust deed recorded 
June 4, 1981. It is also clear that the 
parties did not intend by these or any other 
documents to create a second trust deed in 
favor of State Savings for $45,000.00. 
[26] In Utah the advance of additional 
funds secured by a previously executed and 
otherwise valid trust deed is allowed in 
circumstances where the note and trust 
deed contain clear language that the par-
ties intend to avail themselves of this type 
of arrangement See, Bank ofEphraim v. 
Davis, 559 P.2d 538 (Utah 1977). 
[27] Here there is clear and unambigu-
ous documentary evidence of this intent 
For these reasons the court finds that the 
documents entitled "Additional Advance 
Note and Agreement," dated December 2, 
1981, is a promissory note evidencing the 
advance of additional funds secured by 
State Savings' first trust deed. 
(4) The Homestead Exemption Issue 
The final issue raised in this case is 
whether or not the debtor's claimed home-
stead exemption is valid and, if so, what 
priority it has. In the event the court 
denies debtor his homestead exemption, the 
court is asked, in the alternative, to deter-
mine whether the debtor is entitled to pay-
ment of a real estate commission as an 
administrative expense for his role as a 
listing agent in the sale of the property of 
the estate. 
The Bankruptcy Code allows states to 
pre-empt federal exemptions. Section 
522(b). Utah has acted to pre-empt the 
exemptions provided under applicable fed-
eral law. For this reason, Utah law gov-
erns in this case. See, In re Neiheisel, 32 
B.R. 146 (Bkrtcy.CtD.Utah 1983). 
In Utah, the homestead exemption is re-
quired by the Utah Constitution, Art XXII, 
Section 1: 
The Legislature shall provide by law, for 
the selection by each head of a family, an 
exemption of a homestead, which may 
consist of one or more parcels of lands, 
together with the appurtenances and im-
provements thereon of the value of at 
least fifteen hundred dollars, from sale 
or execution. 
The Utah homestead exemption, enacted 
pursuant to this constitutional mandate, ap-
pears as part of the Utah Exemption Act of 
1981, Utah Code Ann. Section 78-23-1 et 
seq. (1953). That act, in pertinent part, 
provides that 
(1) A homestead consisting of property 
in this state shall be exempt in an 
amount not exceeding $8000 in value for 
a head of family, $2000 in value for a 
spouse, and $500 in value for each other 
dependent . . . 
(2) A homestead shall be exempt from 
judicial lien and from levy, execution, or 
forced sale, except upon the following 
obligations: 
(a) Statutory liens for taxes and as-
sessments on the property; 
(b) Security interests in the property 
and judicial liens for debts created for 
the purchase price of such property; and 
(c) Judicial liens obtained on debts cre-
ated by failure to provide support or 
maintenance for dependent children. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-23-3 (1981). 
In this case, the debtor is claiming a 
homestead exemption of $8,000.00. That 
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exemption must be paid to him out of the 
proceeds of the sale of the property of the 
estate, and it must be paid to him prior to 
the satisfaction of any judicial lien, levy, 
execution, or forced sale, but with certain 
exceptions listed in Utah Code Ann. Section 
78-23-3(2)(aHc) (1953). Three of these ex-
ceptions do not apply in this case: (1) statu-
tory liens for taxes, (2) statutory liens for 
assessments, and (3) judicial liens obtained 
on debts created by failure to provide sup-
port or maintenance for dependent chil-
dren. 
There are two exceptions to the home-
stead exemption that may apply in this 
case: (1) security interests and (2) judicial 
liens for debts created for the purchase 
price of property. 
Here, the subject property is encumbered 
by (1) the first trust deed of State Savings, 
(2) the valid statutory mechanics* liens of 
Stringham Lumber Co., V & H Enterprises, 
and Aire Flo Heating and Electric, (3) the 
second trust deed of Claude Hawk and (4) 
the judicial lien of Parley White dba Parley 
White Realty. The question is which, if 
any, of these encumbrances constitutes an 
exception to the debtor's homestead exemp-
tion by virtue of being either a security 
interest or a judicial lien for a<lebt created 
for the purchase price of the property. 
Upon the answer to this question turns the 
court's determination of which, if any, of 
these claimants are to be paid from the 
proceeds of the sale before the debtor is 
paid his $8,000.00 homestead exemption. 
Since the controlling provisions of Utah 
law were enacted in 1981, no case interpret-
ing the pertinent parts of the homestead 
exemption provisions has been handed 
down. Thus, it befalls this court to inter-
pret the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Sec-
tion 78-23-3(2)(b) (1981). In doing so, the 
court is not without guidance. In their 
analysis of the Utah homestead exemption, 
the editors of Summary of Utah Real 
Property Law, state the following: 
By virtue of his homestead right, a judg-
ment debtor is not excused from execu-
tion against homestead property to satis-
fy debts by lawful mortgage on the 
premises or debts created for the pur-
chase price of the premises. 
1 SUMMARY OF UTAH REAL PROPER-
TY LAW (J. Reuben Clark Law School: 
Brigham Young University, 1978) p. 201. 
The editors rely for this conclusion upon 
the case of McMurdie v. Chugg, 99 Utah 
403, 107 P.2d 163 (1940). That case is, 
obviously, not interpreting the current 
homestead law of Utah; however, its hold-
ing, that vendor's liens on property in the 
amount of the unpaid purchase price there-
of cannot be defeated by a later arising 
claim of a homestead exemption, is instruc-
tive. * 
It appears that this policy was preserved 
in the 1981 Utah Exemption Act, where the 
legislature created, as an exception to the 
homestead exemption: 
Security interests in the property and 
judicial liens for debts created for the 
purchase price of such property. . 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-23-3(2)(b) 
(i981). 
[28,29] This provision denominates two 
exceptions: the first is "security interests," 
and the second is "judicial liens for debts 
created for the purchase price' of such prop-
erty." It is the opinion of this court that 
the phrase "for the debts created for the 
purchase price of such property" found in 
this section modifies the term '^judicial 
liens" only; it does not modify the term 
"security interests." This court concludes 
that the term "security interests," in this 
provision of the Utah Exemption Act, in-
cludes, but is not limited to, security inter-
ests for the purchase price of the property 
to which the security interest attaches. 
For the term "security interest" was meant 
to embrace any consensual security inter-
est in the property by which the owner of 
said property voluntarily pledges that prop-
erty as security for a debt regardless of 
the purpose of the debt This interpreta-
tion is necessary in order to protect credi-
tors who obtain from debtors, by means of 
consensual security agreements, liens upon 
the debtor's property. In view of the con-
sensual nature of these security agree-
ments, a creditor's lien rights arising there-
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on should not be defeated by the debtor's 
claim of a homestead exemption. The 
same protection is not warranted to credi-
tors holding lien rights against the debtor's 
property that do not arise upon the volun-
tary acquiescence of the debtor who agrees 
to pledge his property as security in order 
to obtain a loan, but, rather, arise under a 
statute (as in the case of the mechanics' 
liens in this case) or as a result of a judicial 
action. 
In view of this opinion, the court con-
cludes that the first trust deed of State 
Savings and the second trust deed of 
Claude Hawk are "security interests" with-
in the meaning of Utah Code Ann. Section 
78-2&-3(2)(b) (1953) which cannot be defeat-
ed by debtor's claim for homestead exemp-
tion. 
[30] The court further concludes that 
the valid statutory mechanics' liens 
charged against the sale proceeds do not 
constitute "security interests" within the 
meaning of these provisions because there 
is no evidence before the court that these 
liens arose under contracts, rather these 
lien rights arose under statute and are not 
consensual. Moreover, the term "statutory 
lien," though defined in Utah's Exemption 
Act of 1981 (Utah Code Ann. Section 78-
23-1 et seq. (1953)), is not applied in the 
subsections dealing with exceptions to the 
homestead exemption—an omission by the 
Utah legislature that clearly evidences an 
intent not to include "statutory liens," such 
as mechanic's liens, in the list of excep-
tions. Since these mechanic's liens are not 
"security interests' because they are not 
consensual and since they are not "judicial 
liens for debts created for the purchase 
price of such property" because they arose 
under a statute and not as a result of a 
judicial action, they are not valid exceptions 
to the homestead exemption. Consequent-
ly, the debtor's homestead exemption must 
13. See, Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v. Vance, 
32 Utah 74/88 P. 896 (1907) where the Utah 
Supreme Court invalidated as unconstitutional a 
statutory provision that made homestead ex-
emptions subject to mechanic's liens on grounds 
that such liens were nonconsensual. Whether 
or not the debtor's homestead exemption would 
be paid before any proceeds are distributed 
to the valid mechanics' lienholders in this 
case.13 
[31] The court finds that the judicial 
lien of Parley White dba Parley White Re-
alty which, according to the debtor's sched-
ules, arose upon a judgment entered in the 
Utah District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County in the sum of $14,860.00 on May 5, 
1982, is not a "security interest" for the 
reason that it did not arise by consent of 
the debtor. There is no evidence in the 
record that this judicial lien is for a debt 
created for the purchase price of the prop-
erty. The court, therefore, finds that the 
lien of Parley dba Parley White Realty is 
not an exception to the debtor's homestead 
exemption. 
As a result, the debtor's homestead ex-
emption must be satisfied from the sale 
proceeds before all other liens and encum-
brances with the exception of the first 
trust deed of State Savings and the second 
trust deed of Claude Hawk. 
In view of the decision that this debtor is 
entitled to his homestead exemption, it will 
not be necessary to address the issue of his 
alternative claim to a real estate commis-
sion as an administrative expense. 
CONCLUSION 
The court finds that the notice of sale by 
the bankruptcy trustee together with the 
court's approval of that sale operated to 
extinguish the original liens upon the real 
property of the estate and to create for 
each holder of a valid statutory or judicial 
lien or valid security interest a new secured 
position, which was in all pertinent respects 
equivalent to the original, against the pro-
ceeds of sale. 
Furthermore, in applying the appropriate 
provisions of Utah law, this court concludes 
that the complete absence of an essential 
have defeated the claims of these mechanics' 
lienholders if they had, by means of foreclosure 
actions, reduced their lien claims to judgments 
and claimed that such judgments constituted 
judicial liens for the purchase price of the prop-
erty, is not an argument before the court. 
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element of the oath, the acknowledgment, 
or the certificate required on a mechanic's 
lien notice will render that notice invalid. 
In this case 12 notices of lien were invalida-
ted because of the absence of one or more 
of these essential elements. The court also 
concludes that the lien rights of these 
claimants, recording invalid notices of lien, 
expired under Utah law within 80 days for 
a subcontractor and 100 days for a general 
contractor after the last work was complet-
ed or the last materials furnished to the 
subject property. Consequently, the valid 
recorded second trust deed of Claude Hawk 
has priority over these invalid liens (regard-
less whether or not Claude Hawk had "ac-
tual knowledge" of their prior existence) 
because they expired due to lack of perfec-
tion by proper notice. Only those mechan-
ics recording valid notices of lien continue 
to hold claims with priority over that of 
Claude Hawk. 
Moreover, the first trust deed of State 
Savings is found to secure not only the 
original note for $200,000.00 but the addi-
tional advance of $45,000.00 (less $10,-
000.00 in loan funds never paid out to the 
debtor). 
Finally, the debtor is found to have a 
valid homestead exemption, perfected by 
recordation on August 26, 1981, and that 
said homestead exemption will defeat the 
interests of claimants holding valid me-
chanics' liens as well as claimants holding 
judicial liens not incurred for debts created 
for the purchase price of the subject prop-
erty; consequently, debtor's homestead ex-
emption is subject only to the security in-
terests of State Savings and Claude Hawk. 
An order consistent with this memoran-
dum opinion will enter. 
CASE SUMMARY 
This matter came before the Court on 
January 19, 1984, on the application of 
Claude Hawk Corporation for distribution 
of the proceeds remaining after the previ-
ously authorized distribution of proceeds of 
the trustee's sale of the debtor's real prop-
erty located at 575 Cambridge Circle, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and for an order determin-
ing the distributive priority of claims to the 
sales proceeds. 
The Court, being fully advised in the 
premises and having fully considered the 
motions, memoranda, arguments, and sub-
missions of the parties, issued, on July 11, 
1984, its Memorandum Opinion (Amended). 
This July 11 Memorandum constituted its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
this matter and provided that an order con-
sistent therewith be prepared, under local 
rules, by counsel for the prevailing party. 
In due course, an order was prepared by 
Claude Hawk's attorney, Joel R. Danger-
field. On July 19,1984, an objection there-
to was filed by debtor's attorney, Wendell 
P. Abies. The Court has read the proposed 
order as well as the objection and the coun-
ter-proposal of the debtor. The Court be-
ing duly advised, now issues this Supple-
mental Memorandum Opinion and Order 
for the benefit of the parties hereto and 
their attorneys. 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
[32] On the basis of the analysis set 
forth in its Memorandum Opinion of July 
11, 1984, this Court concludes that, under 
Utah's race-notice statute [Section 57-3-2, 
-3 Utah Code Ann. (Pocket Supp.1983) 1 
the following valid encumbrances in the 
following order of priority originally at-
tached to the property at 575 Cambridge 
Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah: 
(1) The first trust deed of State Savings; 
(2) The statutory mechanics' liens of V & 
H Enterprises, Stringham Lumber Co., 
and Aire Flo Heating; 
(3) The second trust deed of Claude 
Hawk Corp.; and 
(4) The judicial lien of Parley White Re-
alty. 
However, by mandate of the Utah Consti-
tution, Art XXII, Sectiori 1 and the Utah 
Exemption Act [Section 78-23-1, et seq. 
Utah Code Ann. (Pocket Supp.1983)] a 
homestead exemption, regardless of when 
it is claimed or recorded, takes priority 
over all other liens and encumbrances bur-
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dening the subject property with the excep-
tion of those encumbrances listed in Sec-
tion 78-23-3(2XaHc) Utah Code Ann. 
(Pocket Supp.1983)'. By virtue of Utah's 
exemption statute, debtor's homestead ex-
emption takes priority over all the other 
encumbrances except the consensual secur-
ity interests in the property which the debt-
or conveyed to State Savings and Loan 
Association and to Claude Hawk Corpora-
tion. 
The net effect of Utah's homestead ex-
emption law is to re-order the priorities of 
the encumbrances upon the subject proper-
ty, as follows: 
(1) The first trust deed of State Savings; 
(2) The second trust deed of Claude 
Hawk; 
(3) The debtor's homestead exemption; 
(4) The valid mechanics' liens of V & H 
Enterprises, Stringham Lumber, and 
Aire Flo Heating; and 
(5) The judicial lien of Parley White Re-
alty. 
The priorities established by Utah's race-
notice statute [Section 57-3-2, -3 Utah 
Code Ann. (Pocket Supp.1983) ] and Utah's 
mechanic's lien law [Section 38-1-7 Utah 
Code Ann. (Pocket Supp.1983)], are super-
ceded by the constitutional and statutory 
requirements of Utah's homestead exemp-
tion law [Section 78-23-1 et seq. Utah Code 
Ann. (Pocket Supp.1983)]. Whatever the 
original priorities may have been, a claim 
of homestead take precedence over them 
all, with those exceptions mentioned. 
What the Court requires in this case is that 
debtor's homestead exemption allowance of 
$8,000.00 be paid before all other liens and 
encumbrances, except the security inter-
ests of State Savings and Claude Hawk. 
The Court does not speculate upon what 
final distributive prioritization would have 
resulted had the holders of the valid me-
chanic's liens reduced their claims to judg-
ments. 
ORDER 
For the reasons set forth in this Court's 
Memorandum Opinion of July 11, 1984 and 
in this Supplemental Memorandum Opinion, 
it is hereby 
ORDERED that the debtor be, and here-
by is, determined to have a valid homestead 
exemption, perfected by recordation on Au-
gust 26, 1981, that said homestead exemp-
tion will take priority over and defeat the 
interest of the below named claimants hold-
ing valid mechanic's liens, as well as claim-
ants holding judicial liens not incurred for 
debts created for the purchase price of the 
subject property, and that the debtor's 
homestead exemption is subject only to the 
security interests of State Savings and 
Loan Association and Claude Hawk Corpo-
ration and is subordinate in priority to such 
security interests; and it is further 
ORDERED that Theodore E. Kanell, 
trustee, upon the expiration of 10 days 
following the entry of this order, be, and he 
hereby is, directed forthwith to make distri-
bution of the balance of the proceeds of the 
August 15, 1983 trustee's sale of the debt-
or's real property, in the approximate 
amount of $121,450.00, plus any interest 
earned thereon, and after payment of any 
unpaid costs of sale, closing costs, real 
estate taxes, and allowable trustee's fees, 
in the priority, subject to the foregoing 
paragraph, and amounts as follows: 
1. The secured debt owed to State Sav-
ings and Loan Association, evidenced by 
the deed of trust recorded in Salt Lake 
County on December 2, 1981, as Entry No. 
3628145 in the sum of $45,000.00, which 
relates back, for purposes of priority, to 
the State Savings and Loan first deed of 
trust dated June 4, 1981, and recorded as 
Entry No. 3571498 (reduced by $10,000.00 
which was never paid out to the debtor), 
plus any allowed interest, costs, and attor-
ney's fees pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 
506(b). 
2. The secured debt owed to Claude 
Hawk Corporation evidenced by the trust 
deed recorded in Salt Lake County on De-
cember 2, 1981, as Entry No. 3628146 in 
the sum of $44,950.00 with interest at the 
annual rate of 15 percent from June 3, 
1981, yielding $18.47 per day, plus costs, a 
reasonable attorney's fee pursuant to 11 
IN RE DUNCAN" 
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U.S.C. Section 506(b) (which debt Claude 
Hawk agreed to subordinate to the interest* 
>f State Savings). 
3. The homestead exemption allowance 
pursuant to Section 78-23-1 et seq. Utah 
Code Ann. (Pocket Supp.1983) in the 
imount of $8,000.00 to John H. Williamson, 
4. The mechanic's lien filed by V & H 
Enterprises, recorded May 12, 1982, as En-
try No. 3764554 in the amount of $4,720.09; 
the mechanic's lien filed by Stringham 
Lumber Co., recorded May 12, 1982, as 
Entry No. 3674555 in the amount of 
£2,469.88; and the mechanic's lien filed by 
kire Flo Heating & Electric and Earl J. 
Hamert, as Entry No. 3687115 in the 
imount of $669.64-—all three of which liens 
e^late back to June 4, 1981, when the first 
ffork began on or the first materials were 
furnished to the subject property. 
5. The judgment lien filed by Parley 
iVhite dba Parley White Realty in a judg-
ment against the debtor, filed May 6, 1982, 
Case No. C-81-8096 in the District Court of 
Salt Lake-County Clerk's Office in the sum 
)f $14,860.00. 
(o f KEY NUMBER SYSTIM> 
In re Malcolm E. DUNCAN and Genita 
P. Duncan, Debtors. 
In re Marion GEORGE, d/b/a Marion 
George Janitorial, Debtor. 
Bankruptcy Nos. 3-83-00161, 
3-83-00216. 
United States Bankruptcy Court, 
D. Alaska. 
Aug. 10, 1984. 
In two cases in which debtors sought 
to avoid judicial liens for impairment of 
homestead exemptions, the Bankruptcy 
Court, J. Douglas Williams, II, J., held that: 
(1) since there was sufficient value in debtr 
ors' homestead property to support home-
stead exemption after subtracting first 
deed of trust and judicial lien, which was 
second in priority to first deed of trust, 
judicial lien did not create impairment of 
exemption which would result from deduc-
tion of unavoidable junior federal tax liens, 
and thus could not be avoided,' but (2) 
where amount of judicial lien, when deduct-
ed in order of priority from value of second 
debtor's property less homestead exemp-
tion, exceeded remainder by $12,062.97, ju-
dicial lien would be avoided to that extent 
Order accordingly. 
1. Bankruptcy e=>398(l) 
To avoid a judicial lien under Bank-
ruptcy Code, it must be determined if debt-
ors have an exemption which is impaired, 
and, if so, to what extent judicial lien .cre-
ates that impairment. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S. 
C.A. § 522(f). 
2. Bankruptcy e»398(l) 
In order to determine extent to which a 
lien impairs an exemption, and thus is 
avoidable, priority of lien for which avoid-
ance is being sought must be considered. 
Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f). 
3. Bankruptcy <S=>398(1) 
Judicial liens can be avoided for impair-
ment of exemptions only if they impair 
exemptions while still occupying their posi-
tion of priority among liens on subject 
properties. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 522(f). 
4. Bankruptcy e»398(l) 
Since there was sufficient value in 
debtors' homestead "property to support 
homestead exemption after subtracting 
first deed of trust and judicial lien, which 
was second in priority to first deed of trust, 
judicial lien did not create impairment of 
exemption which would result from deduc-
tion of unavoidable junior federal tax liens, 
and thus could not be avoided. Bankr. 
Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f). 
